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3. STATEMENT OF CASE 
i. Nature of the Case 
This is a first party under insured motorist dispute. The 
appeal challenges a District Court decision that refused to follow 
the majority of jurisdictions that apply the constructive 
exhaustion rule for this underinsured motorist claim to proceed. 
ii. Course of Proceedings Below 
The plaintiff first filed the underlying liability case of 
Marcie Rae Hill v. Joseph and Andrea Hamilton; Bingham County Case 
No. CV-2006-1777. There were settlement discussions that' took 
place, between depositions of witnesses, with an offer to settle 
within policy limits before the next sCheduled deposition. The 
parties agreed to settle the case for $24,000.00 subject to 
verification of the defendants' insurance coverage. 
The plaintiff Hill filed her verified complaint for 
underinsurance benefits and demand for jury trial in this case 
against American Family Mutual Insurance Company on August 27, 
2008. A copy of the verified complaint with exhibits is found in 
the CLERK'S RECORD on appeal at pages 1-59. 
The defendant American Family Mutual Insurance Company filed 
their Answer and demand for jury trial on October 3, 2008. See R. 
60-65. The answer claimed that the plaintiff Hill had failed to 
exhaust the $25,000.00 policy limits so that no underinsured 
benefits are due. 
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The plaintiff Hill then filed a motion for summary judgment on 
December 22, 2008. See R. 66-68. The motion was supported by a 
memorandum and brief filed that same date. See R. 69-89. 
The defendant American Family Mutual Insurance Company filed 
a cross-motion for summary judgment on December 26, 2008. See R. 
90-91. The defendants also filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and brief in support of 
their motion for summary judgment. See R. 92-195. 
The appellant then filed a reply brief in support of her 
motion for summary judgment. See R. 96-104. The defendants then 
filed a reply memorandum in support of their motion for summary 
judgment on January 13, 2009. See R. 1l0-1l5. 
A hearing was held on the motions on January 21, 2009 with 
District Court Judge Stephen Dunn presiding, that was reported in 
the transcript on appeal. The court noted that this was an 
interesting issue of first impression that the Idaho Supreme Court 
would have to ultimately resolve and decide. Tr. 23-24. 
The Court issued it's MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on February 10, 2009. See R. 116. 
The District Judge found that, "It is the Court's view that the 
clear majority of jurisdictions have adopted Hill's position. A 
substantial minority of cases have held to the contrary." See R. 
123. However, the Court then granted the respondent American 
Family Mutual Insurance Company motion for summary judgment and 
dismissed the case. R. 117-128. This appeal followed. 
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iii. A Concise Statement of Facts 
The facts in this case are taken from the verified complaint 
for insurance benefits and demand for jury trial; see R. l-ll. 
These facts are set forth for the court virtually verbatim below. 
A. PARTIES 
1. The plaintiff, Marcie Rae Hill, at all times material 
hereto was a citizen and resident of Bingham County, Idaho. 
2. The defendant, American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 
dba American Family Insurance, is -a foreign insurance corporation 
licensed to do business in the State of Idaho. 
3. This Court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction; 
and venue is proper in this Court against a foreign corporation. 
The amount in controversy exceeds $10,000.00 so jurisdiction is 
proper in District Court. 
B. THE INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN FORCE 
4. The plaintiff Hill at all times material to this case had 
in force a policy of automobile insurance with the defendant 
American Family Insurance. A true and correct copy of this entire 
insurance policy is attached to the verified complaint (but not 
this brief) as Exhibit 1, R. 15-35. 
5. The policy of insurance attached as Exhibit 1 contained 
coverage for underinsured drivers. The policy clearly provides 
underinsured motorist coverage up to a limit of $100,000.00 per 
person or $300,000.00 for each accident. 
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6. There was also in force, at times material to this case, 
a policy of automobile insurance between Joseph and Andrea Hamilton 
and Farm Bureau Insurance Company. A copy of this insurance policy 
is attached to the complaint as Exhibit 2, R. 36-52. 
7. This policy of insurance attached to the complaint as 
Exhibit 2 had coverage policy limits of $25,000.00 per person. 
C. THE FACTS OF THE COLLISION OF HAMILTON WITH HILL 
S. On or about Monday, November 7, 2005 plaintiff Hill was 
driving a 1999 Chrysler four-door sedan (VIN No. 2C3HD46J6XH604760) 
southbound in the inside lane of traffic on South Yellowstone 
Highway in Idaho Falls at about 3:38 p.m. 
9. On or about Monday, November 7, 2005 Andrea Hamilton was 
driving a 1995 Ford CNT four-door vehicle (VIN No. 
1FALP65LSSKl14489) east bound stopped in a driveway heading onto 
South Yellowstone Highway. Defendant Andrea Hamil ton. went to make 
a left turn and pulled directly into the path of the plaintiff 
Hill's vehicle causing a sudden and unexpected collision. This 
vehicle was owned by Joseph Hamilton, who had authority to decide 
whether or not she drove the vehicle. 
10. The plaintiff Hill honked her horn, applied the brakes 
and turned the wheel but there was then a sudden, violent and 
painful collision that she could not avoid. The plaintiff Hill was 
not negligent or at fault at all in this case. 
11. A copy of the Idaho Motor Vehicle Collision Report in 
this case is attached to the complaint as Exhibit 3, R. 53-55. 
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12. The defendant Andrea Hamilton was 15 years old at the 
time of the accident and had only been licensed for a few months at 
the time. Defendant Andrea Hamilton admitted that she had been 
talking on her cell phone at about the time of the accident and 
also admitted the accident was her fault and apologized for the 
accident. Defendant Andrea Hamilton pled guilty to a violation of 
Idaho Code § 49-641 on turning left while failing to yield the 
right of way to another vehicle. However, Hamilton alleged that 
there was comparative fault on plaintiff Hill's part in this case. 
D. PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES, LOSSES, DAMAGES AND INSURANCE 
13. The plaintiff Hill was transported to Eastern Idaho 
Regional Medical Center by her husband following the motor vehicle 
accident. Plaintiff Hill complained of back pain, and right leg 
pain just below the knee. The emergency room doctors found that 
she did suffer from back pain, and right knee pain. A physical 
examination showed some bilateral paralumbar spasm and tenderness 
in plaintiff Hill's back, with a contusion and some tenderness over 
her right knee patellar tendon. 
14. Subsequently, the plaintiff Hill continued to have 
difficulty with her right knee. The plaintiff Hill then sought 
treatment from Dr. Brumfield with the Community Care Clinic, who 
found that her knee would lock up and she had swelling in her knee 
and calf. She was placed in a knee brace and on pain medication 
and was placed on work restriction because of the pain from the 
knee injury. 
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15. The plaintiff Hill then had an MRI at the Mountain View 
Hospital in Idaho Falls, Idaho. This showed a ganglion cyst in the 
anterior aspect of the intra condylar notch that was apparently 
caused by the injury and collision in this case. 
16. The plaintiff Hill was then referred for treatment to 
Casey Huntsman, M.D. of Huntsman Orthopaedic Surgery and Sports 
Medicine. Dr. Huntsman saw plaintiff Hill on December 6, 2005 for 
pain in her right knee. He notes that she was treated by Dr. 
Brumfield at the Community Care Clinic and placed in a knee brace 
and, after the MRI, found that she had some right knee damage so 
she was referred for further treatment. Plaintiff Hill reported 
that the pain got worse and she had popping and catching as well as 
giving way. Dr. Huntsman found that she had a positive patellar 
grind test with a 1+ crepitus (crackling and popping) and motion 
mainly in the anterior aspect of her knee, with a ganglion cyst 
from the anterior cruciate ligament injury and a sprain of the 
fibular collateral ligament. 
17. Dr. Huntsman then prescribed treatment from Channing 
Physical Therapy for the swelling in her knee. She had limi ted 
range of motion with significant knee pain and crepitus in the 
knee. The compression test reproduced the symptoms of the injury. 
The plaintiff Hill then obtained physical therapy for some months 
and gradually got better, but eventually reached a plateau where 
she did not improve and further treatment was actually causing her 
more harm and pain. Therefore, plaintiff Hill terminated her 
treatment at Channing Physical Therapy in December of 2005. 
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18. Dr. Huntsman recommended conservative care to see if her 
knee would improve over time. In January of 2006 plaintiff Hill 
came back and saw Dr. Huntsman again and he noted that she was 
somewhat (30%) better, but the doctor noted that her knee still had 
crepitus, with a positive patellar grind test. The assessment at 
that time was a patellar contusion with collateral ligament strain. 
The plaintiff Hill was treated conservatively with anti-
inflammatory injections and told to stretch her legs. 
19. The plaintiff Hill was then inj ected with an anti-
inflammatory injection, but this trigger point injection did not 
improve her condition. She then had another trigger point 
injection on March 23, 2006 which helped a little but then at that 
point her condition was as bad as it was before. The plaintiff 
Hill's knee was locking up and she could not even ride a bike. The 
doctor found that there was a cartilage problem and since they had 
treated her conservatively for five and a half months it was 
determined that surgical intervention is definitely indicated and 
recommended by the doctor to the plaintiff Hill. 
20. Dr. Huntsman has stated that a right knee arthroscopy for 
diagnostic purposes and to treat any problems that were found was 
indicated and prescribed in this case. Dr. Huntsman requested 
payment but plaintiff did not have any resources to pay this 
expense even after settling her case with the Hamiltons. 
21. The cost of the right knee arthroscopic surgery for 
diagnostic and treatment purposes is estimated by Huntsman 
Orthopaedic to be about an additional $6,700.00, plus a similar 
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amount for the hospital, or about $13,500.00 to $14,000.00 total. 
Plaintiff Hill also had other damages including her medical bills 
incurred to date, accrued lost wages, pain and suffering. 
22. Plaintiff Hill also has lost wages from this accident in 
the amount of about $2,190.00 or more. 
E. EXHAUSTION OF BENEFITS ON HAMILTON'S FARM BUREAU POLICY 
23. The plaintiff filed the underlying liability case of 
Marcie Rae Hill v. Joseph and Andrea Hamilton; Case No. CV-2006-
1777. This case was li~igated vigorously for over a year. 
24. The owner of the motor vehicle in this case, the 
defendant Joseph Hamilton, was insured by Farm Bureau. There was 
a request for production of his insurance policy but this was not 
produced until a request from his counsel for settlement for policy 
limits was made during depositions and prior to trial. 
25. There were settlement discussions that took place 
following the deposition of Lynn H. Woodland in the case of Marcie 
Rae Hill v. Joseph and Andrea Hamilton; Case No. CV-2006-1777. The 
defendants advised that their policy limits in this case were only 
$25,000.00. This had not been previously discussed or produced in 
discovery, and a copy of the declaration sheet was requested so the 
plaintiff could verify this information. The declaration sheet 
showed that there were policy limits for bodily injury of 
$25,000.00 for each person, or $50,000.00, per occurrence, for two 
or more people. This is consistent with the minimum requirements 
of Idaho law for liability insurance coverage found at Idaho Code 
§ 49-117 et seq. 
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26. The defendants Hamilton stated they would consider a 
policy limits offer, so the plaintiff Hill made a policy limits 
offer for $25,000.00, plus the other available coverage that may 
apply. The defendants Hamilton counter offered with $23,000.00 
only if accepted before the deposition of the next witness. 
27. The parties agreed to settle the case for $24,000.00 
subject to additional property damage coverage and verification of 
the defendants' insurance coverage on full review of the complete 
verified copy of the declaration sheet and policy under oath by 
Farm Bureau. 
28. There was no reasonable alternative to settlement because 
of the costs of going to trial, the risk of an adverse result based 
on the disputed liability and damages, and the potential for an 
award to the defendants Hamilton of costs and/or attorney fees. 
29. In this case the plaintiff Hill takes the position that 
she has exhausted by settlement th~ limits of liability with the 
defendants Hamilton and Farm Bureau. She pursued that case 
vigorously through litigation and it was only in the middle of 
depositions that Hamilton and Farm Bureau made an offer to settle 
for $24,000.00, which is basically the amount of the policy limits 
in this case, on the condition that the settlement be accepted 
immediately due to the pending depositions and trial. Therefore, 
the plaintiff Hill made all reasonable good faith efforts she could 
to exhaust the limits of liability by settlement in this case. 
30. The plaintiff Hill acknowledges that the defendant 
American Family Insurance Company should be credited for the 
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additional $1,000.00 that may have allegedly been available from 
the Hamilton and Farm Bureau policy in this case. Therefore, the 
plaintiff Hill's underinsured motorist claim against the defendant 
American Family Insurance Company for the total sum of $18,000.00 
(rather than the $19,000.00 earlier claimed) which gives American 
Family Insurance Company credit for the total amount of the 
Hamilton and Farm Bureau policy in effect at the time. 
F. CLAIM FOR AMERICAN FAMILY UNDERINSURANCE BENEFITS 
31. As a result of said acdident, the plaintiff Hill suffered 
substantial damages, including but not limited to, property 
damages, past and future medical expenses, economic and non-
economical damages, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of 
life beyond the $25,000.00 policy limits of the Hamilton Farm 
Bureau policy. Her knee surgery alone will cost and additional 
$14,000.00 or more. 
32. Subsequently, the plaintiff Hill informed the defendant 
American Family that Andrea Hamilton's insurance coverage with Farm 
Bureau Insurance was not sufficient to compensate her for her 
damages and that she was making a claim against the underinsured 
motorist coverage under her policy. 
33. The plaintiff Hill forwarded to the defendant American 
Family her last settlement demand to Farm Bureau on their insured 
Hamilton. This letter made a final total last settlement demand of 
$43,000.00. However, the plaintiff Hill's damages could be much 
greater than this figure but this represented a fair compromise of 
her claim based on the facts in this case. 
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the American Family Insurance Company ICS (Integrated Claims 
System) claim form in this case showing that American Family 
Insurance Company established an under insured motorist claim limit 
reserve of $5,000.00 on this claim. A true and correct copy of 
this document is attached as Exhibit 104 and is bates stamp marked 
as HI1100002; and is found at R. 88. 
The plaintiff appellant also augmented the record below and on 
appeal with a page from the American Family Insurance Company Excel 
Manual produced in discovery marked as HI1100339 (Exhibit 106), in 
the supplement to the record. This policy manual summarizes Idaho 
law generally but then states that, "If consent to settle is given 
for an amount less than UIM insurance limits, make sure any setoff 
is allowed for the full amount of UIM tortfeasor's policy." 
H. SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS 
The plaintiff Hill then filed a response to the American 
Family motion for summary judgment on the facts. 
found at R. 96-104 and is set out below. 
This reply is 
1. Factually, American Family admits that Ms. Hamilton was 
primarily responsible for the accident. Further, the defendant 
correctly states that the plaintiff Hill settled for $24,000.00, 
$1,000.00 less than the limit contained in the Hamilton's liability 
policy. Moreover, American Family notes that Hill is pursuing a 
claim for underinsured motorist coverage against American Family 
for $18,000.00 giving American Family full credit for the policy 
limits of the Hamilton Farm Bureau policy. 
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2. There are two points with which the plaintiff takes issue 
with American Family. First, the plaintiff did request production 
of the Farm Bureau policy in the litigation and later when the 
offer to settle within policy limits was made. Second, during this 
period of time, the plaintiff thought she had "bare bones" coverage 
and did not understand that she had under insured motorist coverage 
available that would be voided by accepting the Farm Bureau offer. 
See Affidavit of Marcie Rae Hill in Augmented Record on appeal. 
3..In the prior case of Hill v Hamilton, the plaintiff filed 
a reques~ for production of documents to Ms. Hamilton's counsel and 
the defendants filed "Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First 
Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests 
for Admission" that are attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of 
Christopher Graham in this case. A copy of the Farm Bureau 
insurance policy was requested in Request for Production Number 4, 
Page 9. There was an objection to production of this document, and 
a statement that the policy was produced. However, the defendant 
Farm Bureau's counsel did not attach a copy of this insurance 
policy to the responses to the request for production as 
represented in the response that was filed with the Court. 
4. Therefore, the plaintiff Hill did inquire as to the 
limits of liability insurance in place but Farm Bureau did not 
respond by production of the policy until a later request was made 
that the plaintiff provide an offer to them within their policy 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 13 
limits that had to be accepted immediately. The plaintiff Hill 
accepted the offer contingent on production of the policy that 
showed $25,000.00 in policy limits existed in that case. 
5. The plaintiff Hill did not have access to her American 
Family Insurance policy at the time the plaintiff settled the case 
because the policy was several years old and she did not have it in 
her possession. Moreover, she thought at that time that she had a 
nbare bones" policy of insurance and was not aware that 
under insured motorist coverage existed at the time. She was 
certainly not aware of the exhaustion policy limits requirement at 
the time she settled the case with Farm Bureau, and did not 
understand that this coverage would be voided by accepting the Farm 
Bureau offer. 
6. The plaintiff Hill takes the position that there should 
be a setoff allowed for the full amount of the UIM tortfeasor's 
policy which gives American Family Insurance Company the benefit of 
their policy so that they suffer no prejudice in this case. 
The court at the hearing on the summary judgment motion 
inquired on these issues as well at Tr. 10-11. Hill had not read 
the policies at issue when the case was settled because of the time 
constraints involved and deadline to acceptance of the offer. Tr. 
10-11. She did not actually have her American Family policy until 
it was produced in response to the demand letters in this 
litigation. Tr. page 11, lines 16-17 and page 19. 
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The court then inquired as to the reasonable or constructive 
exhaustion of the American Family policy. Hill's counsel noted 
that there was no reasonable alternative to settlement since it 
would cost several thousand dollars to obtain, at most an 
additional $1,000.00 in insurance benefits. Further, there was 
some down side risk of an adverse award of costs and attorney fees 
(at that time under the overruled case law of Gillihan v. Gump, 140 
Idaho 693, 99 P3d, 1083 (Ct. App. 2003). Tr. 12-13 and 16. 
Finally, it is in the interests of judicial economy to try the case 
just once, and not twice, in order to obtain the under insured 
benefits. Tr. 17. 
In response to the court's question, counsel for American 
Family could not identify any harm or prejudice to American Family 
from the constructive exhaustion doctrine. See Tr. 27-28, defense 
counsel states he is not sure Insurance Company harmed. American 
Family was concerned about where the courts draw the line on these 
types of claims. 
4. Issues on Appeal 
A statement of the issues on appeal are as follows: 
a. Whether Marcie Rae Hill reasonably or constructively 
exhausted the insurance policy of Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company as required by her policy with American Family Mutual 
Insurance Company? 
, 
b. Whether Idaho should follow the clear majority of 
jurisdictions that have adopted the constructive exhaustion rule? 
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5. ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff and appellant Marcie Rae Hill claims attorney's 
fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839. This statute 
provides for an award of attorney's fees to insureds in lawsuits 
against insurers. 
6. ARGUMENT 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN INSURANCE INTERPRETATION DISPUTES 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently discussed once again the 
standards for interpretation of an insurance contract in a summary 
judgment motion. In Arreguin v. Farmers Insurance Company of 
Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 180 P.3d 498 (March 31, 2008) the court said: 
When reviewing a district court's grant of summary 
judgment, this Court uses the same standard a district 
court uses when it rules on a summary judgment motion. 
Jordan v. Beeks, l35 Idaho 586, 589, 21 p.3d 908, 911 
(2001). Summary judgment shall be rendered when "the 
pleadings, depOSitions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). This Court will liberally construe the 
record in favor of the party opposing the motion for 
summary judgment and will draw all reasonable inferences 
and conclusions in favor of that party. Farmers Ins. Co. 
of Idaho v. Talbot, l33 Idaho 428, 431, 987 P.2d 1043, 
1046 (1999). 
The court in Arreguin v. Farmers also reviewed the rules for 
interpretation of an insurance contract that are known to the 
parties and counsel. These are contracts of adhesion that are 
construed against the insurance company drafter in favor of 
coverage. Ambiguities are resolved in the insured's favor with 
exclusions not presumed or inferred. The court held that: 
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"When interpreting insurance policies, this Court 
applies the general rules of contract law subj ect to 
certain special canons of construction." Clark v. 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 540, 66 
P.3d 242, 244 (2003). "The general rule is that, because 
insurance contracts are adhesion contracts, typically not 
subject to negotiation between the parties, any ambiguity 
that exists in the contract 'must be construed most 
strongly against the insurer.'" Talbot, 133 Idaho at 432, 
987 P.2d at 1047 (quoting Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. 
Roberts, 128 Idaho 232, 235, 912 P.2d 119, 122 (1996)). 
Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of 
law over which we exercise free review. Id. *** 
When we determine whether a policy is ambiguous we 
ask "whether the policy 'is reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretation.'" Talbot, 133 Idaho at 432, 
987 P.2d at 1047 (quoting Mut. of Enumclaw v. Box, 127 
Idaho 851, 853, 908 P.2d 153, 155 (1995) (quoting City of 
Boise v. Planet Ins. Co., 126 Idaho 51, 55, 878 P.2d 750, 
754 (1994))). A provision that seeks to exclude the 
insurer's coverage must be strictly construed in favor of 
the insured. Moss v. Mid-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
103 Idaho 298, 300, 647 p.2d 754, 756 (1982). The "burden 
is on the insurer to use clear and precise language if it 
wishes to restrict the scope of its coverage." Id. *** 
Furthermore, a provision excluding coverage is 
strictly construed in favor of the insured and the 
insurer has the burden to use clear and precise language 
if it is restricting the scope of its coverage. Moss, 103 
Idaho at 300, 647 P.2d at 756. "[Elxclusions not stated 
wi th specificity Yv'i 11 not be presumed or inferred. ff 
Clark, 138 Idaho at 541, 66 P.3d at 245. 
The issues raised by this case are matters of law, since no 
evidence was taken and there are no findings of fact. This Court 
exercises free review over matters of law. See Iron Eagle v. 
Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 491, 65 P.3d 509, 513 
(2003); numerous other citations omitted. 
The Idaho legislature has recently amended the Idaho Insurance 
Code on casualty insurance contracts to make it clear that 
underinsured motorist coverage is required to be offered by all 
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casualty insurance companies in Idaho beginning January 1, 2009. 
See amended Idaho Code § 45-1502(1). Further, the Idaho 
legislature also amended the definition of underinsured motorist 
coverage at Idaho Code § 41-2503(2) to read as follows: 
41-2503 (2) For purposes of under insured motorist 
coverage, subject to the further definitions, terms and 
conditions of such coverage, the term "underinsured motor 
vehicle" means a motor vehicle that is a self-insured 
motor vehicle, or a motor vehicle that is covered by a 
policy of motor vehicle 
indemnity bond, with limits 
least equal to those limits 
Idaho Code. 
liability insurance or an 
for bodily injury or death at 
set forth in section 49-117, 
The plaintiff would submit that her underinsured motorist 
coverage policy falls within this definition. The Hamilton Farm 
Bureau policy provided the minimum policy limits in Idaho. 
The District Court below found that, "The Idaho Supreme Court 
has made statements in other cases which suggest that 9 statute 
requiring uninsured motorist coverage does create a public policy 
to be considered. See, e.g, Erland v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 136 
Idaho 131, 30 p.3d 286 (2001); Farmers Ins. Co. Of Idaho v. Buffa, 
119 Idaho 345, 806 P.2d 438 (1991)." The District Court then noted 
that whether this amendment establishes a public policy favoring 
under insured motorist coverage in Idaho is a question for the Idaho 
Supreme Court. R. 12. The answer should be in the affirmative and 
that constructive exhaustion should be the rule in Idaho. 
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B. MAJORITY RULE OF CONSTRUCTIVE EXHAUSTION SHOULD BE ADOPTED. 
The relevant portions of the defendant American Family 
Insurance Company insurance policy and contract is attached to the 
complaint as Exhibit 1 at R. 15-35. The American Family policy 
states, in part, on page 18 of the policy at R. 33 (the second to 
the last page), that the defendant American Family will pay 
underinsured benefits as follows: 
We will pay under this coverage only after the limits of 
liability under any bodily injury liability bonds or 
policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or 
settlements. 
There are no Idaho cases on the validity of this exhaustion 
clause. However, the vast majority of other jurisdictions have 
held that the exhaustion of the prior coverage clause in the 
American Family policy is either unenforceable as against public 
policy favoring settlements, or alternatively that a credit should 
be given for the full amount of the policy limits but that the 
plaintiff may litigate her claims. See Taylor v. Government 
Employees Insurance Company, 90 Hawaii 302, 978 P.2d 740 (Hawaii 
1999) excerpt, including a discussion with numerous other citations 
in accord. See also Combs v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 
119 Ohio App.3d 137, 694 N.E.2d 555 (Ohio 1997); Harper v. 
Providence Washington Insurance Company, 753 A2d 282 (Pa. 2000), 
providing that a credit must be given for the amount of the 
underlying policy including the gap for litigation expenses saved; 
Augustine v. Simonson, 940 P.2d 116, 238 Mont. 259 (Montana 1997); 
Mann v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 108 Nev. 648, 836 P.2d 620, 621 (Nevada 
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1992); Mulholland v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 171 
Ill.App.3d 600, 527 N.E.2d 29, (Ill. 1988); Schmidt v. Clothier, 
338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983) (superseded by statute); Longworth v. 
Van Houten, 223 N.J.Super. 174, 538 A.2d 414 (N. J. 1988); Hamilton 
v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 107 Wash.2d 721, 733 P.2d 213 
(1987); Cobb v. Benjamin, 482 S.E.2d 589 (South Carolina App. 
1997). Numerous other citations omitted, but set out below. See 
also District Court decision on motions for summary judgment below 
in the record at R. 123-124. 
In Taylor v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 90 Hawaii 
302, 978 P.2d 740, 750-751 (Hawaii 1999) the court discussed the 
applicable law in detail. The court held as follows: 
[W]e hold that exhaustion clauses are void as 
against public policy. Many jurisdictions have concluded 
that a UIM insurer cannot require that its insured 
exhaust the tortfeasor's insurance prior to applying for 
UIM benefits. See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Knight, 506 
So.2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Mulholland v. State 
Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 527 N.E.2d 29 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); 
Brown v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 1203 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1992); Schmidt, supra; t"lann v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 836 
P.2d 620 (Nev. 1992); Longworth, supra; Buzzard v. 
Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 824 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1991); 
Sorber v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 680 A.2d 881 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1996); Olivas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 850 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App. 1993); see also 3 Alan I. 
Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance, § 
44.2, at 357-359 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 1998). We agree 
with the following reasoning of the Longworth court: 
"The exhaustion clause requires that the insured 
settle with or obtain judgment against the tort feasor in 
the full amount of the tortfeasor's own liability 
coverage before the UIM carrier has any payment 
obligations at all under the UIM coverage. The adverse 
impact of this clause on. the legislative purpose in 
providing for UIM coverage is immediately apparent. It 
means that the tortfeasor's carrier, by offering to 
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settle for a sum somewhat less than the policy limits, 
can force the victim to trial solely in order to protect 
his UIM claim. In effect then, the victim is denied the 
perfectly reasonable choice of saving months, if not 
years, of delay, trial preparation expense, and all the 
ensuing wear and tear by simply accepting the offer and, 
as a condition of proceeding with his UIM claim, 
foregoing the difference between the tortfeasor's policy 
limit and the tortfeasor's insurer's offer. This was in 
fact the situation in Schmidt. In one of the cases there 
reviewed, the tortfeasor's carrier offered to settle with 
the victim for $22,000 out of a $25,000 liability policy. 
One of the questions was whether the insured could accept 
the offer without impairing his UIM rights. The court 
concluded that because the exhaustion clause in this 
respect was unenforceable, it could not bar the insured's 
right to accept the offer. 
Horace Mann Insurance Company v. Adkins, 215 W.Va. 297, 599 
S.E.2d 720 (2004), is one of the last cases to consider this issue. 
The Court ruled on similar facts that the doctrine of constructive 
exhaustion allows an injured insured to collect under insured 
motorist benefits under his/her own policy of motor vehicle 
insurance for damages that exceed the available limits of a 
tortfea~or's liability policy when (1) the injured insured's 
underinsured motorist coverage requires exhaustion of a 
tortfeasor's applicable liability limits as a prerequisite to 
his/her recovery of underinsured motorist benefits; (2) the injured 
insured settles with the tortfeasor's insurer for less than the 
tortfeasor's full liability limits that are available to the 
insured, but is treated as having received said full liability 
limits for purposes of recovering underinsured motorist benefits 
under his/her own policy of insurance; and (3) the injured 
insured's recovery of underinsured motorist benefits is limited to 
those damages that exceed the amount of the tortfeasor's full 
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liability limits available to the insured. The court stated, at 
footnote 12, that the majority rule is as follows: 
"This position is consistent with a majority of 
other courts that have examined exhaustion clauses in 
policies of motor vehicle insurance. See, e.g., Omni Ins. 
Co. v. Foreman, 802 So. 2d 195 (Ala. 2001); Country Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Fonk, 198 Ariz. 167, 7 P.3d 973 (2000); New 
Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Knight, 506 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1987); 
Taylor v. Government Employees Ins. Co., (supra) 90 
Hawaii 302, 978 P.2d 740 (1999); In re Rucker, 442 N.W.2d 
113 (Iowa 1989); Metcalf v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 944 S.W.2d 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. Faris, 27 Mass. App. ct. 194, 536 N.E.2d 1097 
(1989); Linebaugh v. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 224 Mich. 
App. 494, 569 N.W.2d 648 (1997); Schmidt v.Clothier, 338 
N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983), superseded by statute as stated 
in Onasch v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1989); Augustine v. Simonson, 283 Mont. 259, 940 
P.2d 116 (1997); Barrett v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 
295 N.J. Super. 613, 685 A.2d 975 (1996); Bogan v. 
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 36 Ohio St. 3d 22, 521 N.E.2d 
447 (1988), overruled on other grounds by Ferrando v. 
Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Ohio St. 3d 186, 781 N.E.2d 
927 (2002), review denied, 98 Ohio St. 3d 1463, 783 
N.E.2d 521 (2003) (unpublished table decision); Buzzard 
v. Farmers Ins. Co. Inc., 824 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1991); 
Vega v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 323 Or. 291, 918 P.2d 
95 (1996), superseded by statute on other grounds as 
stated in Hamm v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 612 N.W.2d 775 
(Iowa 2000); Sorber v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 451 
Pa. Super. 507, 680 A.2d 881 (1996); LeFranc v. Arnica 
Mut. Ins. Co., 594 A.2d 382 (R.I. 1991), superseded by 
statute as stated in Sunderland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 717 
A.2d 53 (R.I. 1998); Cobb v. Benjamin, 325 S.C. 573, 482 
S.E.2d 589 (Ct. App. 1997); Leal v. Northwestern Nat'l 
County Mut. Ins. Co., 846 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1993); Hamilton v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 107 
Wash. 2d 721, 733 P.2d 213 (1987). Despite the fact that 
constructive exhaustion is the majority view, a 
substantial number of states have, nevertheless, declined 
to adopt this doctrine. (Citations omitted). 
The rationale for the constructive exhaustion rule was set out 
by the District Court decision at R. 123-124. The Court said that, 
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"A summary of the arguments in favor of allowing underinsured 
motorist claims in cases like this were cogently set forth in 
Augustine, 283 Mont. at 266, 940 P.2d at 120: 
In sum, the policy reasons for not enforcing exhaustion 
clauses include the following rationales. Exhaustion 
clauses promote litigation expenses which lessen the 
insured's net recovery. The time involved in litigation 
serves to delay payment of UIM benefits to the insured. 
Furthermore, such clauses fail to recognize that the 
insured may have a legitimate and valid reason for 
accepting less than the tort feasor , s policy limits, i. e., 
the cost and risk of litigation and issues of proof. 
They fail to consider that the under insured carrier can 
compute its payments to the insured as if the insured had 
exhausted the tortfeasor's policy, thereby not 
prejudicing the UIM carrier. Finally, under an 
exhaustion clause the tortfeasor's carrier can force the 
injured party to go to trial by offering less than the 
policy limits, thereby increasing costs, litigation, and 
delay. 
We conclude that this reasoning is consistent with the 
public policy of this State. It is also consistent with 
the purpose of underinsurance, to provide indemnification 
for accident victims when the tort feasor does not provide 
adequate indemnification. Sorensen, 927 P.2d 1002. 
Furthermore, it is consistent with the declared public 
policy of this State to encourage settlement and avoid 
unnecessary litigation. Holmberg v. Strong (1995), 272 
Mont. 101, 106, 899 P.2d 1097, 1100. Therefore, we 
conclude that the provision requiring that the 
tortfeasor's liability insurance be entirely exhausted as 
a prerequisite to securing indemnification from the 
underinsured motorist coverage is contrary to the public 
policy of the State of Montana and is unenforceable to 
the extent that it violates public policy.u 
The public policy of Idaho is also to encourage settlements 
and avoid unnecessary litigation. See Kohring v. Robertson, 137 
Idaho 94, 99, 44 p.3d 1149 (2002); Loomis Inc. v. Cudahy, 104 Idaho 
106, 108, 656 P.2d 1359 (1982); Loomis and Nettleeton Co. v. Tiger 
Enterprises Inc., 99 Idaho 539, 542, 585 P.2d 949 (1978); numerous 
other citations omitted. 
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American Family relies heavily on the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin case that ruled in their favor in the case of Danbeck v. 
American Family Mutual Ins. Co. The Court should also closely 
review the entire decision in the case of Danbeck v. American 
Family Mutual Insurance Company, 629 N.W.2d 150, Wis. (2001) The 
first thing the Court should note is that this was a closely 
divided opinion subject to a vigorous dissent by two justices, 
including the Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The 
dissent states that this decision was contrary to the established 
Wisconsin jurisprudence and other law. The decision cited in 
footnote number 3 of the brief include a total of six other states, 
far less than the majority of the decisions from other 
jurisdictions that have found that the exhaustion requirement is 
void as against public policy. 
The plaintiff does not dispute the American Family contention 
that some other jurisdictions that have found that the exhaustion 
requirement is void as against public policy were based at least in 
part on the statutes of these states. However, the other cases 
were based on the common law and found to be void as against public 
policy without reference to such statutes. Finally, even the 
cases that were based on such statutes were based in part on the 
common law. These authorities from neighboring sister states like 
Montana, Nevada, Washington, and Oregon, do travel well and this 
majority rule should be applied in Idaho and in this case. 
The defendant also cited the case of Qualcomm, Incorporated v. 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 161 Cal.App.4th 184 (Cal. 
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4th Dist. Ct. Appeals, March 25, 2008) does not involve the issues 
in this case. The Qualcomm case involves a primary insurance 
policy limits of 20 million dollars for a shareholder derivative 
action dispute, and an excess policy issued by Lloyd's of London to 
the Qualcomm Board of Directors. The Court held that the primary 
insurance would have to be exhausted before the secondary insurance 
policy would be in effect. 
This is a vastly different situation than the one before the 
Court as the plaintiff Hill is a consumer (rather than a large 
corporation), and her case involves under insured motorist coverage 
(rather than a primary and excess dispute). The Court noted that 
excess insurance was expressly understood by both the insurer and 
insured to be secondary to the specific underlying coverage which 
will not attach until the primary coverage is exhausted. See 73 
Cal.Rpts.3d at 777. The Qualcomm case was also contrary to other 
existing California authority. 
J. CONCLUSION 
The opinions of the courts to consider this issue as discussed 
above are especially applicable in this case. The plaintiff Hill 
settled her case in good faith and reasonably exhausted the bodily 
injury liability bonds or policies by payment or settlement, such 
that proceeding further would have been futile, consistent with 
public policy of the State of Idaho. 
The settlement in the Marcie Hill case for $24,000.00 on a 
$25,000.00 policy limit satisfied the exhaustion requirement since 
the gap between the actual settlement and the maximum amount 
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available under the policy limit approximates, or in this case, was 
far less than the litigation costs saved. The settlement by the 
plaintiff Hill meant that she only has to try her case once to 
obtain an adequate recovery, rather than twice against the original 
defendant and her insurance carrier. 
The plaintiff Hill has already stated that she is certainly 
willing to allow the defendant American Family Insurance Company 
credit for the amount of the underinsured coverage of $25,000.00 
consistent with the opinion of the majority of the courts to 
consider this issue. Therefore, the Court should rule that the 
American Family Insurance Company exhaustion clause does not bar 
the plaintiff's claim. 
The plaintiff Hill presents a compelling case for legal and 
equitable relief from the provisions of strict interpretation of an 
ambiguous policy provision buried deep in one paragraph on page 19 
of her American Family policy. The policy provision should be read 
to require only reasonable efforts to exhaust by payment of 
judgments or settlements from the tortfeasor's policy and 
constructive exhaustion of all available benefits, not two trials 
which would be a costly and a futile gesture in most cases. 
The majority of the courts from other jurisdictions to 
consider the precise issue in this case have concluded that the 
exhaustion requirement is void and against public policy since it 
will discourage settlement of the underlying litigation and require 
two jury trials on the same claim. The small minority of cases 
from other jurisdictions to enforce the precise language are 
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contrary to even their own jurisprudence and reach a mechanical 
unjust result. The Court may give American Family Mutual Insurance 
Company the full benefit of their bargain and policy language by 
simply giving American Family full credit for the Farm Bureau 
policy limits of $25,000.00. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff and appellant Marcie Rae Hill has 
reasonably and constructively exhausted the Farm Bureau policy 
limits and the case should be allowed to proceed, with American 
Family to receive credit for the Farm Bureau policy limits. The 
District Court decision should be reversed and the case remanded 
for a jury trial on merits. 
Dated this 20 th day of July 2009. 
Charles Johnson 
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